Abstract. Threat knowledge-bases such as those maintained by MITRE and NIST provide a basis with which to mitigate known threats to an enterprise. These centralised knowledge-bases assume a global and uniform level of trust for all threat and countermeasure knowledge. However, in practice these knowledge-bases are composed of threats and countermeasures that originate from a number of threat providers, for example Bugtraq. As a consequence, threat knowledge consumers may only wish to trust knowledge about threats and countermeasures that have been provided by a particular provider or set of providers. In this paper, a trust management approach is taken with respect to threat knowledge-bases. This provides a basis with which to decentralize and delegate trust for knowledge about threats and their mitigation to one or more providers. Threat knowledge-bases are encoded as Semantic Threat Graphs. An ontology-based delegation scheme is proposed to manage trust across a model of distributed Semantic Threat Graph knowledge-bases.
Introduction
Threat management is a process used to help implement a security configuration that mitigates known enterprise (security) threats. Centralised threat knowledgebases, such as NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [1] are an integral part of the threat management process. However, in practice threat knowledgebases are composed of threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures that originate from multiple providers, for example US-Cert [2], Bugtraq [3] and/or vendors (such as Cisco and Microsoft). As a consequence, threat knowledge may only be trusted if it has been asserted by a particular provider or set of providers. For example, a consumer of the NVD may only want to trust knowledge about software buffer-overflow vulnerabilities that have been asserted by Bugtraq and corresponding countermeasures asserted by Microsoft. However, access to a centralised threat knowledge-base implies a global or uniform level of trust for all knowledge about threats, vulnerability and countermeasures indiscriminately. This paper adopts a trust management approach with respect to threat knowledge-bases. The advantages are twofold. The first is that it provides a basis with which a consumer may delegate authority to trusted providers for knowledge about threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Secondly, it provides a basis to decentralize a threat knowledge-base where trusted threat knowledge may reside with the originating provider and/or be distributed across other trusted provider threat knowledge-bases.
Threat Trees/Graphs, such as [20, 28, 29] , are used to represent, structure and analyse what is known about threats and their countermeasures. In this paper, threat knowledge-bases are encoded as Semantic Threat Graphs [20] . We argue that using an ontology-based framework provides a natural approach to constructing, reasoning about and managing decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs. An ontology provides a conceptual model of a domain of interest. It provides a framework for distributed and extensible structured knowledge founded on formal logic [7] . In recent years, research in computer security has seen an increase in the use of ontologies. For example, ontologies have been applied to the areas of information security (common security vocabulary) [24] , security management (threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures) [17] , access control [15] , policy management [25] and trust management [33] . The decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs (ontology fragments) are implemented in OWL-DL, a language subset of OWL which is a W3C standard that includes Description Logic reasoning semantics [30] .
Distributed fragments of Semantic Threat Graphs that are naturally composable under the open-world assumption, provide a unified view of the threat-based domain. Ontologies provide for separation of concerns, whereby consumers and providers of threat-based knowledge can be separately developed, with reasoning and deployment over their composition done locally. It also means that information about new threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures can be incorporated as new facts within existing Semantic Threat Graph knowledge-bases.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Description Logic. Section 3 outlines the Semantic Threat Graphs model and an encoding of standards of best practice for threat mitigation. Section 4 describes the delegation scheme used to manage trust across a model of distributed threat knowledge-bases. A model for decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs is presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides use case scenarios that demonstrate how the approach may work in practice. Related research is discussed in Section 7.
Description Logic and Knowledge-Bases
The Description Logic SHOIN (D) is a decidable portion of First Order Logic that can be used to represent and reason about application knowledge and is commonly implemented as OWL-DL [7] . Knowledge is described in terms of concepts about individuals and their relationships. For example, suppose that concept DOS describes denial of service threats and concept TCPcntr describes TCP-stack based countermeasures such as syn-cookie and syn-cache, then the concept (∃ 1 mitigates.DOS) ⊓ TCPcntr can be considered to characterize TCPcntr countermeasure concepts that mitigate denial of service threats. In this case mitigates is a property that has been defined between DOS threats and countermeasures. For example, the individual countermeasure syn-cache is related (property mitigates) to the individual DOS threat syn-flood. A Description Logic concept corresponds to a unary predicate; intuitively, it represents a set, and concept conjunction (⊓) and disjunction (⊔) provide set intersection and union, respectively. A Description Logic property (role) corresponds to a binary predicate. The concept (∃ ≥1 p.φ) defines individuals related to at least one individual of concept φ via property p.
A knowledge-base comprises a terminological component, hereafter referred to as its TBox, and an assertional component (its ABox ). In addition to describing concepts, a TBox may define concept and property relationships. These are given as axioms of the form φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 , given concepts φ 1 and φ 2 and where subsumption ⊑ can be interpreted as subset. For example, the TBox containing the concepts from the previous paragraph could include the axiom DOS ⊑ Threat, indicating that denial of service is a kind of threat. Property subsumption axioms may similarly be defined, which we also represent as φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 if no ambiguity arises.
Semantic Threat Graphs
Semantic Threat Graphs [20] , a variation of the traditional Threat/Attack Tree, are encoded within an ontology-based framework. Figure 1 provides an abstract model for Semantic Threat Graphs and identifies the key concepts and relationships.
Enterprise IT assets are represented as individuals of the Asset concept. An asset may have one or more hasWeakness's (property relationship) that relate to individuals categorised in the Vulnerability concept. Individuals of the Vulnerability concept are exploitable (exploitedBy) by a threat or set of threats (Threat concept). As a consequence, an asset that has a vulnerability is, therefore, also threatenedBy a corresponding Threat. A countermeasure mitigates particular vulnerabilities. Countermeasures are deemed to be kinds-of assets and thus are defined as a subConceptOf Asset.
Semantic Threat Graphs can be used to encode standards and best practices for threat mitigation using firewalls [20] . Mis-configured firewall security configurations have the potential to expose both internal servers and the firewalls themselves to threats. For example, consider the following scenario where a webServer is susceptible to a threat SynFlood attack via the vul WebTCPConnOverflow weakness. An individual vul WebTCPConnOverflow is representative of a weakness in the TCP stack where it is possible exceed the maximum number of socket connections permitted by the TCP protocol due to a syn flood attack [32] . An iptables rule, represented as individual iptr SynThresholdWeb , mitigates the vulnerability vul WebTCPConnOverflow on the Web server (webServer). Note that we use humaninterpretable names (in a typewriter font) for individuals in the ontology as a way of suggesting their meaning. For example, individual iptr SynThresholdWeb represents an iptables rule (iptr) that limits TCP syn packet connections to the Web server (SynThresholdWeb). The Semantic Threat Graph model presented in Figure 1 can be further refined with sub-concepts. For example, the Threat concept can define a number of sub-concepts in accordance with best practice, such as the Microsoft STRIDE standard whereby threats are categorised as (Figure 2 ): Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege [23] . A similar hierarchy is adopted for the corresponding vulnerability and countermeasure concepts. A best practice standard is a high-level document, written in natural language (typically English text), that defines a set of recommended best practices (countermeasures) to protect sensitive and critical system resources. Best practice standards for network access control, including NIST for secure Web-servers [34] and Internet RFCs for anti-bogon (RFC3330) are encoded as Semantic Threat Graphs (ontologies). How these best practice standards are encoded in terms of Semantic Threat Graphs is described in [20] . For example, Table 1 provides a Semantic Threat Graph interpretation for part of the NIST-800-41 standard [35] for firewall configuration. FBP-1 recommends that (spoofed) packets arriving on an external interface claiming to have originated from either of the three RFC1918 reserved internal IP address ranges should be dropped. Such traffic indicates a denial of service attack typically involving the TCP syn flag. Therefore, T hreat individual threat Inbound192.168.0.0/16SrcIPPkt , is asserted to be a member of subconcepts Spoofing, DenialOfService and RF C1918T hreat. Figure 2 illustrates a partial hierarchy of threats.
ID Recommendation Description FBP-1 Deny "Inbound or Outbound traffic from a system using a source address that falls within the address ranges set aside in RFC1918 as being reserved for private networks" [35] . 
Knowledge Delegation as Subsumption
A (distributed) system may comprise of a number of separately managed knowledge bases. Each knowledge-base is assumed to have a unique name that indicates its controlling/owning principal. We assume that each atomic concept (or property) φ syntactically embeds the name (φ) N of the principal that describes the concept (or property). For example, a TBox owned by principal A includes a concept A:DOS where (A:DOS) N = A. A principal P has jurisdiction over any concept (or property) φ if (φ) N = P ; this means that P is considered to be the original authority on φ.
Note that while a TBox may contain concepts originating from different principals, all concepts referenced in a concept expression are required to have the same name. For example, (A:Threat ⊓ A:DOS) N = A. This ensures a consistent interpretation for our syntatic approach to referencing (the originator of) concepts. Future research will consider how a permission-naming logic such as [21] can be used to provide a consistent treatment for the originators of a concept such as (A:Threat ⊓ B:DOS).
Principals may make public assertions about terminological knowledge. A public assertion P | ≈(φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 ) is a statement by principal P about concept (or property) subsumption. For example, A | ≈(B:DOS ⊑ A:Threat) is an assertion by A that its concept of threat includes B's concept of denial of service. These ontology mappings can be used to implement delegation of jurisdiction. Given (φ 1 ) N = Q and (φ 2 ) N = P then P | ≈(φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 ) is an assertion by P that it trusts Q when it describes φ 1 to the extent that Q's concept of φ 1 can be considered as a kind of φ 2 concept over which P 's has jurisdiction. For example, suppose that principal B provides a vulnerability reporting service, then assertions A | ≈(B:DOS ⊑ A:DOS) and A | ≈(B:mitigates ⊑ A:mitigates) mean that A trusts B's mitigation knowledge for denial of service attacks.
Transitive subsumption in SHOIN (D) can be used to reason over chains of delegation statements. For example, public assertion B | ≈(C:mitigates ⊑ B:mitigates) indicates that the vulnerability reporting service B trusts mitigation recommendations provided by a software developer C. Continuing the example, principal A can use these public assertions to deduce that C:mitigates ⊑ A:mitigates and thus be happy to trust mitigation recommendations from the software developer.
The following rule defines the conditions under which an arbitrary principal may import, into its TBox, a public assertion (delegation) from P .
This does not extend the semantics of SHOIN (D) , rather, it is a syntactic treatment whereby delegation statements translate to concept axioms that can in turn be reasoned over within SHOIN (D) . This treatment is easily modeled within OWL-DL. The URI of an OWL-DL document provides its principal/namespace. A public assertion P | ≈(φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 ) is an ontology document that is trusted to originate from the namespace of P : this trust can be achieved by P signing the document. The ontology-import constructor owl:imports is used to import a public assertion that is confirmed to come from a from another namespace.
The assertional component of a knowledge base, hereafter referred to as its ABox, contains assertions about named concept individuals. A concept assertion φ(i), indicates that named individual i is a member of concept φ; a role (property) assertion p(i, j) indicates that named individual i is related to named individual j under property p. For example, ABox assertion DOS(syn-flood) describes that individual syn-flood is a DOS threat and ABox role assertion mitigates(syn-cache,syn-flood) describes that the syn-cache countermeasure mitigates a syn-flood threat.
We use a similar naming scheme for individuals whereby (i) N indicates a principal/namespace syntactically embedded in the identifier of the individual i. Principals may make public assertions about individuals. A public assertion P | ∼ φ(i) is a statement by P that named individual i is a member of concept φ. A principal may not make public assertions about ABox knowledge (concept and individual) that is not under its jurisdiction. However, a principal may use subsumption to infer ABox knowledge that is effectively under the jurisdiction of others. The following rule defines the conditions under which an arbitrary principal may import, into its ABox, a public assertion from P about a named individual i and concept φ. These public ABox assertions are a syntactic treatment that do not extend SHOIN (D) . In practice, OWL-DL individuals include reference to their namespace (principal) and a public ABox assertion P | ∼ φ(i) is an ontology document that has been signed by its originator P and a valid φ(i) can be imported into another ontology using the owl:imports constructor.
In general, a public TBox assertion P | ≈(φ 1 ⊑ φ 2 ) is effectively a delegation certificate that can be understood as a statement P | ≈(φ 2 ⊃ φ 1 ) in a delegation logic such as [4] , where φ 1 and φ 2 are unary (or binary) predicates that refer to static principals (φ 1 ) N and (φ 2 ) N , respectively. A public ABox assertion P | ∼ φ(i) is a signed value of type φ that can be effectively considered to be a form of a signed permission that cannot be forged by another principal that does not hold jurisdiction.
Note that for ease of presentation, delegation of trust is assumed transitive. Non-transitive trust can be incorporated into the model, for example, by adding a SPKI-style [16] delegation-bit to delegation certificates. Alternatively, a KeyNote-style [12] Action Authorizers concept could be added to the ontology to constrain the delegation.
Delegation in Semantic Threat Graphs
A decentralized Semantic Threat Graph (STG) uses subsumption to model the delegation of jurisdiction over (potentially distributed) fragments of a Semantic Threat Graph. These fragments can include concepts such as V ulnerability, T hreat and Countermeasure, assertions about membership of these concepts and assertions about properties between the concepts. In this section, we outline how the delegation involving these fragments is encoded using subsumption; Section 6 will provide complete examples of decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs. Y asserts that it trusts principal X's knowledge about threats that exploit the X : vul WebTCPConnMax . Therefore, threat is X : threat SynFlood is considered a threat (a member of concept Y : T hreat) within principal Y 's knowledgebase. Note, concept X : exploits ∋ X : vul WebTCPConnMax is a sub-concept of the ∃ ≥1 X : exploits.X : V ulnerability.
Decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs: Use Cases
In this section, a series of examples are presented in order to demonstrate how decentralized Semantic Threat Graphs may work in practice and in which we identify some potential business usage patterns (Figure 3) . We believe this to be an improvement over the current centralised approach where trust between different providers is not discriminated.
Knowledge about threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures while originating from a number of providers, is typically managed within centralised threat knowledge-bases such as NIST's National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [1] . The advantage of decentralising a threat knowledge-base means that threat knowledge may reside with the originating provider and/or be distributed across other trusted third party providers. A disadvantage of a centralised approach is that it implies on the part of a consumer a global level of trust for all threat knowledge indiscriminately. However, a consumer may only wish to trust threat knowledge that has been provided by a particular provider or set of providers. For example, a consumer of the NVD may only want to trust knowledge about network-based Denial of Service threats that have been provided by US-Cert and corresponding (firewall) countermeasures provided by Redhat. The advantage of a trust management approach is that it provides a basis with which a consumer may delegate authority to trusted providers for threat knowledge. In practice, providers/producers construct fragments of Semantic Threat Graphs and consumers make assertions about the conditions under which they trust the fragments provided by providers. These are defined as a combination of STG Concept, Property and Property Restriction delegation assertions described in the previous section.
Use Case 1. A company (for example, ACME Inc.) having a consumer role, delegates jurisdiction for knowledge about threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to one or more trusted compliance agencies (for example, NIST) having a role of a provider. A compliance agency, having a consumer role in this instance, in turn delegates jurisdiction for knowledge about threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to one or more trusted vendors (for example Redhat). A vendor (provider) may then notify the company with respect to Semantic Threat Graph knowledge it has jurisdiction over. The company can import these STG assertions into its knowledge-base and use the knowledge during reasoning. For example, principal ACME asserts:
NIST : NIST80041Threat ⊑ ACME : Threat NIST : NIST80041Vulnerability ⊑ ACME : Vulnerability NIST : NIST80041Countermeasure ⊑ ACME : Countermeasure NIST : exploits ⊑ ACME : exploits NIST : mitigates ⊑ ACME : mitigates indicating that it trusts countermeasure recommendations made by NIST regarding threats and vulnerabilities that are to be mitigated in order to be be compliant with NIST-800-41 [35] firewall best practice. Note that, when no ambiguity can arise, we drop the turnstile notation "| ≈" and "| ∼" and infer the principal from the statement.
Principal NIST, in turn, asserts:
RH : exploits ⊑ NIST : exploits RH : mitigates ⊑ NIST : mitigates indicating that principal RH (Redhat vendor) is trusted to specify Linux iptables firewall countermeasures used to mitigate spoofing threats and associated vulnerabilities. Intuitively, the NIST compliance agency has outsourced the instantiation of spoof-based threats and recommended firewall countermeasures to
Redhat. Note, the delegation statement made by NIST also includes additional knowledge about its threat and vulnerability hierarchy. For example concept NIST : Spoofing is a subsumed by concept NIST : NIST80041Threat. Delegation chains (transitive subsumption) constructed in terms of concept and property subsumption can be reasoned over within OWL-DL to establish if received ABox statements are to be trusted and imported. For example, Redhat (principal RH) asserts the following anti-bogon IP spoofing threat information: On receipt of this ABox statement principal ACME has no prior trust relationship with RH. However, given the set of known delegation statements, ACME can form the following delegation (trust) chains.
RH : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Threat ⊑ ACME : Threat RH : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Vul ⊑ ACME : Vulnerability RH : IptablesRule ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Countermeasure ⊑ ACME : Countermeasure RH : exploits ⊑ NIST : exploits ⊑ ACME : exploits RH : mitigates ⊑ NIST : mitigates ⊑ ACME : exploits As a consequence, ACME can deduce that the ABox mitigation knowledge received from RH is trusted. It then becomes possible for ACME to deduce a new concept hierarchy within its local Semantic Threat Graph knowledge-base, for example:
RH : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Threat ⊑ ACME : Threat in addition to the following inferred concept membership and property relations: In this example, ACME makes the same TBox statement for delegation of jurisdiction to NIST defined in the previous scenario. Principal NIST delegates jurisdiction to CVE (compliance agency) for knowledge about NIST-800-41 spoofing threats and vulnerabilities only.
NIST : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Threat NIST : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Vulnerability CVE : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : Spoofing CVE : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : UnAuthPkt CVE : exploits ⊑ NIST : exploits Principal NIST also asserts the following delegation statement stating that principal RH is trusted for NIST-800-41 based iptables firewall countermeasures.
RH : iptablesRule ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Countermeasure RH : mitigates ⊑ NIST : mitigates Note, trust is not bidirectional. Given that RH has not been given jurisdiction over relevant threats and vulnerabilities with which to make iptables recommendations, it must also delegate jurisdiction to NIST for this knowledge.
NIST : Spoofing ⊑ RH : Spoofing NIST : UnAuthPkt ⊑ RH : UnAuthPkt NIST : exploits ⊑ RH : exploits Principal RH receives the following ABox statements from CVE for which it has no prior trust relationship. Principal ACME can form a chain of trust based on its trust for NIST and NIST's trust for CVE and RH. For example:
CVE : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : Spoofing ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Threat ⊑ ACME : Threat CVE : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : UnAuthPkt ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Vul ⊑ ACME : Vulnerability RH : IptablesRule ⊑ NIST : NIST80041Countermeasure ⊑ ACME : Countermeasure Use Case 3. This scenario is a variation of use case 2. A company may trust one or more vendors for Semantic Threat Graph ABox statements where each vendor may in turn trust other vendors and/or compliance agencies for ABox Semantic Threat Graph statements. For reasons of space, we do not provide example TBox delegation statements and Abox statements.
Related Research
The delegation scheme proposed in this paper is based on managing trust across a model of distributed knowledge-bases. While the model is simple, it closely resembles the OWL-DL approach to modular ontologies [22] using the owl:imports constructor with a URI based namespace. Future research will explore representing and reasoning about distributed trust in other modular Description Logic languages such as [14, 36] . The TBox intensional reasoning provided by existing OWL-DL reasoners is relatively scalable, however, extensional reasoning is poor for medium to large-sized ABoxes.
A large body of research results exist on Trust Management and decentralized authorization systems, for example, [9, 13, 16, 27] . However, there has been little consideration regarding how it might be applied to managing trust relationships across knowledge-bases, which is considered in this paper. In [31] , a centralised reference ontology is developed to represent trust requirements. Agarwal and Rudolph [5] present an ontology for SPKI/SDSI certificates. In [5] SPKI names are represented as concept names while public keys are represented as individuals. However, once the ontology is constructed any reasoning over delegation chains for the purpose of compliance checking is performed outside of the ontology framework.
Trust Management systems typically describe policy and authorization in terms of discrete permissions and/or assertions. In this paper, authority (about STGs) is defined in terms of Description Logic concepts. Description Logic has been used to describe and reason about RBAC [18] and XACML policies [26] with subsumption providing role/authorization hierarchies, but do not consider the jurisdiction that principals may have over the ontologies in their local knowledgebases. Semantic SPKI [6] uses subsumption to define SDSI local name bindings, however an external certificate discovery algorithm implements name reduction. In our paper, public keys are used to uniquely identify principals and their name spaces. Future work will extend this to support SDSI naming, based on the logic described in [21] .
The requirements of Distributed Semantic Threat Graphs determined our particular use of Trust Management and effectively corresponds to a conventional compliance check [13] : for a given delegation network, is a principal trusted for some action? This check returns a binary answer and we believe that the model could be extended to support forms of quantitative trust, by incorporating KeyNote-style [12] compliance values or weights [11, 19] in the delegation statements. We also assume that trust is monotonic, for example, it is safe to rely on a Semantic Threat Graph delegation chain provided by a vendor since the model does not permit other principals to make conflicting assertions about concepts that originated from the vendor's namespace. Supporting non-monotonic trust, including inter-policy-conflicts such as [10] , is non-trivial and effectively requires synchronization of the distributed ABox/TBoxes. Providing support for distributed ontologies is an active research topic [8] . The extent to which these other forms of reasoning over the distributed ontology are applicable, and could be supported by extending our current model, is a topic for future research.
Conclusion
In this paper, a trust management approach is proposed to decentralize and delegate knowledge for threats and their mitigation (encoded as Semantic Threat Graphs) to one or more trusted providers. That is, the ability to trust-manage the (delegation) relationships that may exist between the providers.
The ontology-based delegation scheme used subsumption to model the delegation of jurisdiction over (potentially distributed) fragments of a Semantic Threat Graph. This paper extends the model from [20] -which did not consider the possibility that threat catalogues may originate from different trusted providers -to a decentralized trust model.
In this paper, the Semantic Threat Graphs knowledge-bases comprised of knowledge about standards and best practices for threat mitigation using firewalls. The applicability of the (centralised) approach of encoding numerous bestpractices is demonstrated in [20] . We argue that the effort of decentralizing this cataloging exercise is comparable. Future work will consider constructing Semantic Threat Graphs from additional threat knowledge-bases such as NVD.
